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Abstract:
We use data from a newly designed household survey in Senegal to study intrahousehold allocation 
of remittances income. In this survey, households are split between sub-groups of individuals, in a 
way that is natural to households and that corresponds to the internal budgetary arrangements found 
in the extended families of Senegal. We find that remittances accruing to specific individuals in the 
household are not completely fungible with other sources of income. In particular the school 
enrolment of children aged 7 to 13 is found to depend on remittances income accruing to the sub-
group he/she belongs to and not on the remittances accruing to other sub-groups. Looking at total 
expenditures, we also find that transfers received by a sub-group are a significant determinant of its 
own consumption, contrarily to transfers received by other groups. This is not true for food 
consumption, suggesting that households tend to satisfy the basic needs of all their members.
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1Introduction
For many poor households in developing countries, remittances are assumed to contribute in an 
important way to living standards. In fact, in these countries, a significant share of households often 
receives private transfers either from relatives residing elsewhere or from a migrant member who 
either joined an urban centre or moved abroad. 
Private transfers that do not originate from migrant members are rarely discussed, except through 
the angle of insurance (Townsend (1994) launched a seminal work, reviewed in Morduch (1999) 
and Dercon (2002)). On the other hand, international migrants’ transfers have been extensively 
studied. An abundant literature tries to assess the aggregate impact of international remittances on 
poverty (Adams and Page 2003), investment (Chami, Fullenkamp et Jahjah (2003)), or on 
inequality (Stark et al. 1988, Taylor et al 2005). From the microeconomic point of view, there is 
now a wide literature on the impact of migrants’ remittances on the well-being of the origin 
household, linked to the literature on migration decisions. In fact, migration of one family member 
has been analysed since the late 1980’s as a family decision aiming at generating a new source of 
income, of which a part is sent to the members who stayed in the original location either to alleviate 
credit constraints for an investment, to compensate for a shock or to preventively diversify sources 
of income. These three motives for migration, investment, ex-post income smoothing or ex-ante 
insurance, have been widely discussed (Stark and Lucas 1988, Rosenzweig 1988, Paulson, 2000, 
Yang and Choi 2007). A number of papers examine how migration flows responded to household 
characteristics or life events to try to assess from this analysis what were the motivations to remit 
but also to migrate (de la Brière et al 2002). The question of whether remittances are used mainly 
for consumption or might have a long term impact on well-being through their contribution to 
investment has also been studied (Azam and Gubert 2006, Mesnard 2004, Yang 2008).  
In this literature, migration is viewed as a decision that involves two actors: the migrant, who will 
or not remit some of his migration earnings, and the staying household, or household of origin. The 
household of origin is considered as a whole, with no regards for intra-household resource 
allocation, assumed, by default, to be egalitarian. Remittance flows are perceived as an extra 
income, assumed to be perfectly fungible with other sources of household income (unless the 
remittances are in fact the migrant’s own savings – Yang (2006)). If it were the case, any flow of 
income similar in amount and timing to the remittances flow, whether generated by household 
members or from public transfers, should be spent in the same way. This would hold true if 
household’s decisions were Pareto optimal, an assumption that  appears to be violated in the two 
2African cases where it has been tested, that of Burkina Faso households (Udry 1996), and that of 
Ivorian ones (Duflo and Udry 2004). Duflo and Udry’s paper shows that in Ivorian households, the 
budget has several components that are not controlled by the same household members and that are 
earmarked for certain consumption goods. The segmentation is strong enough to prevent the 
household from achieving consumption smoothing even when shocks are perfectly observable.
If, indeed, all sources of income are not fungible and if, furthermore, members of the household do 
not all have a similar access to household’s resources, two new questions arise about the impact of 
remittances on the standards of living: who in the household benefits from remittances and what are 
they spent on?
First, the staying household is in general composed of several members who might not have the 
same access to resources, whether earned or unearned income. In particular, they might not all have 
equal access to remittances. If all the sources of income are pooled to form the household total 
budget and if the allocation of this budget among household members disregards the contribution of 
each one, as the unitary household model would suggest, then the origin of income doesn’t matter. 
If, however, intra-household sharing of resources is affected by individual contribution to total 
income, then remittances and earned income alike would affect an individual’s share of total 
consumption   insofar   as   it   affects   his   bargaining   power   within   the  household.   Within   this 
framework, it might be the case that earned and unearned incomes affect individual bargaining 
power differently. The impact of remittances and that of labour income on intra-household resource 
allocation would then be different. Finally, a third possible case is that private transfers and labour 
income are not fungible. If it implies, for example, that remittances are not pooled within the 
household even if earned incomes are, the extra income that transfers represent for their designated 
beneficiaries might not be fully compensated for by changes in the intra-household allocation of 
other resources. 
Whether remittances are fully shared within the household or not, and whether they are fungible 
with other income source, matters for the evaluation of their impact on household well-being. In the 
case where they are mostly kept by an individual or a group, they might be spent for personal use 
without providing any improvement to the lot of other household members. 
The second question, related to that of the fungibility of various sources of income, regards the 
specific use of the remitted income: can the receiving household or receiving member really spend 
it as they wish, or is the money remitted earmarked for specific expenditures? The adverts of 
various international money transfer companies are usually suggestive of the fact that remittances 
are used for the education of offspring or younger siblings, or for the support of aging parents etc. If 
remittances are fungible with other income sources, then the actual impact of the remittances, for 
example on educational spending, will not be different from that of any other source of income. If, 
3however, earmarking by the remitter is taken into account by the receiving household, then the 
marginal spending of different incomes will differ by type of expenditures. In a context where 
resources are scarce, earmarking might be an efficient way to avoid dilution in routine consumption 
and allow investment.
In this paper, we study the allocation of remittances in a country where both migration and 
household structure are of particular interest, namely Senegal. It is a country characterized by very 
large household sizes (with an average of slightly more than 8 members, Senegal displays 
particularly large households, although decreasingly so) and by non nuclear household structures as 
we will describe later. Field interviews we conducted made clear that budgetary arrangements 
within the household do not entail income pooling. In fact, members generating income have a 
specific control over the spending made with it. Furthermore, Senegal, like other countries of the 
region, has a very mobile population, with both important internal and international migration. 
Hence, it is likely that a large share of households have close parents in a position to remit some 
income from outside the household. The first objective of this paper is to see whether remittances 
are captured by a sub-group of household members or pooled with the general household budget. 
Additionally, we would like to assess whether the extent of pooling depends on the amount remitted 
(as a share of total expenditures), on the identity of the remitter (in particular his relation to the 
various household members), on the location of the remitter and on the identity of the receiver.  The 
second objective is to see whether earmarking is effective, i.e. whether remittances aimed at 
financing a particular expenditure (such as the education of a particular child) are actually spent 
more than proportionally for this purpose. 
Hence, we want to enquire precisely whether the fact that remittances may be received by a 
particular household member for a particular purpose indeed affects consumption patterns or 
whether the reallocation of other sources of income is such that  an income increase due to 
remittances, even when they are earmarked, has the same impact as any other extra income. If the 
earmarking by the migrant is indeed effective, then the impact of remittances on poverty or well 
being will differ among household members. While we have no reason to expect public transfers to 
be allocated in a similar manner as private transfers, the study of remittances may still be a source 
of information on the use of the latter. If the earmaking by a private provider is effective, this may 
also hint towards non fungibility of public transfers. If this is the case, substitution between private 
and public transfers is likely to be very imperfect, perhaps avoiding crowding out. Furthermore, it is 
quite possible that targeted public transfers be particularly effective in reaching the target person in 
the household, if they are allocated similarly to private transfers, i.e. not fungible.
4One of the reasons why these issues have not been tackled so far in the literature is the lack of 
adequate data. We use original Senegalese household survey data that are exceptionally suitable for 
this work. These data emanate from a survey, entitled “Pauvreté et Structure Familiale” (henceforth 
PSF) that we designed in co-operation with the Senegalese Statistical Agency (ANSD). Information 
on consumption was collected in detail at the level of subgroups of household members. The data 
also specifies the sources of funding for each type of good. Hence, it offers a unique opportunity to 
enquire into the details of the spending of remittances, allowing to answer the two questions of 
whether remittances are dedicated to specific types of spending (such as health or education) or just 
poured into the general budget and of whether they benefit more some household members than 
others. The PSF survey also collected rich information on siblings of each household member, 
allowing to instrument transfers received by sub-groups and circumvent the endogeneity pertaining 
to the differential receipt of transfers within the household.
The data
The PSF Survey.
The PSF survey results from cooperation between a team of French researchers and the National 
Statistical Agency of Senegal.
1 We designed the survey specifically to be able to study the issues of 
households’ well-being in relation to household structure. Long interviews were conducted with 
households in order to obtain, in addition to the usual information on individual characteristics, a 
detailed description of households’ structure and budgetary arrangements.
In order to do this, households were divided into subgroups according to the following rule: the 
head of household and unaccompanied dependent members, such as his widowed parent or children 
whose mother do not live in the same household, are grouped together. Then, each wife and her 
children make a separate group. Finally, any other family nucleus such as a married child of any 
member with his/her spouse and children also form separate groups. This decomposition emerged 
from field interviews as being the relevant way to split the households in groups. 
1 Momar Sylla and Matar Gueye of the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie of Sénégal (ANSD), on 
the one hand and Philippe De Vreyer (University of Paris-Dauphine and IRD-DIAL), Sylvie Lambert (Paris School of 
Economics(INRA)) and Abla Safir (CREST-INSEE and Paris School of Economics (INRA)) designed the survey. The 
data collection was conducted by the ANSD thanks to the funding of the IDRC (International Development Research 
Center) and CEPREMAP.
5Considering these subgroups allows us to obtain in a simple way a complete description of family 
relations within the household. For example we know whether an individual who has no blood 
relation to the household head is his wife’s brother or her child from a first marriage. This is a 
major difference with usual household surveys that only record relation to the household head.
In order to obtain information on intra-household resources allocation and budgetary arrangements, 
the recording of expenditures was split between those regarding consumption common to the whole 
household (notably those for some public goods and some staples) and those that benefit to a 
specific household member or group of members.  For each group, we also collected information on 
who contributed to each particular expense, whether it is another household member or not. As a 
result, we know whether a given member receives transfers from outside the household, who is the 
remitter and whether he resides abroad or not. We also interviewed the household’s members 
directly about the private transfers they receive, and what motivated them. This is the source of 
information we use throughout the paper.
The survey sample was targeted at 1800 households spread over 150 clusters drawn randomly from 
the census districts so as to insure a geographically representative sample. About 1750 records can 
be exploited. 
Descriptive statistics
As mentioned previously, the average household size in the survey is very high, in line with what 
was found in previous household surveys in Senegal. We find slightly more than 8 members on 
average, with a maximum that reaches 45. This is partly explained by the prevalence of polygamy: 
24% of the married men are engaged in a polygamous union, the proportion being 37% among 
married women. Nevertheless, on average 36% of households’ members are neither the household 
head, nor one of his wives or children. This testifies for the importance of the extended family: 66% 
of the households include such extended family members.
Such structures fairly naturally give rise to arrangements that differ from those observed in nuclear 
families. In this paper, we will examine three sets of expenditure. We examine food expenditures, 
as the very basic and necessary household expenditure.  We also examine non food expenditures for 
which disparities within the household may be greater, as they span a larger set of goods, less 
necessary. Lastly, we examine education, a long-term investment. As for food expenditures, we find 
that, in 17% of the households, meals are not shared by all members: subgroups emerge that take 
6some or all of their meals separately, widening the possibility for differences in nutritional intake 
among household members. Indeed, it can be observed that the ratio of the per capita food 
expenditures in different groups of the same household can vary from 1 to 7.8. The inequality is 
fairly limited though as the ratio is lower than 1.5 in 95% of the households. 
When looking at total expenditures, inequalities within the household are more striking: the ratio 
between the expenditures of the richest group and the poorest group of a household can be as high 
as 18 and is still equal to 4.4 after trimming off the 5% most unequal households.
There are also important variations in the educational achievement of the various children of the 
households.   Households   who   include   children   in   the   age   range   7   to   13,   corresponding 
approximately to the primary school age group, have on average 2.2 such children, of whom only 
1.3 are currently enrolled in a formal school and 0.4 never went to school.
When we turn to transfers, we see that 57 % of the households benefit from some. These transfers 
represent on average 10.4% of the household expenditures. For households who receive at least one 
transfer from someone in Senegal, the average amount is slightly above 14% and it reaches 30% for 
households who receive at least one transfer from abroad. Transfers generally accrue to one 
particular member, this member being the household head in the case of 40% of transfers only. 
When considering household heads, the amount received, relatively to the group expenses, are 
higher, sometimes even greater than the total consumption of the group. This is likely due to the 
fact that household heads receive transfers that they redistribute. For this reason, in the results 
presented below we concentrate on the groups that do not include the household head. Lastly, 
examining earmarking, 25% of the transfers are mentioned as catering for the expenditures of a 
specific household member.
Transfers received come mainly from family members (76 %). 
The partition of remittances by motives is given in table 1. 37% of the transfers from close relatives 
are meant to help facing financial difficulties. Gift are observed with the same frequency. If 
transfers for other reasons are added to the former two motives,  in total, transfers that are not meant 
to be used for specific purpose represent more than 80% of the total. Out the other fifth, the two 
main motives for transfers are ceremonies (accounting for half of them) and education. .Table 2 
shows that the largest amounts are observed for transfers received because of financial problem or 
to finance the education of a child: they are on average 1.8 times larger than transfers received to 
pay for health expenditures and 6 times bigger than those aimed at ceremonial purposes (table 2). 
7Focusing on the geographic origin of remittances, for transfers sent by the parents, spouse or 
children (hereafter referred to as close relatives) of a household member, they come from abroad 
27% of the time. These transfers from abroad account on average for 25% of the amounts received 
from these relatives, but this share becomes more important as household income increase, 
becoming greater than what is received from relatives in Senegal only for the top decile of the 
distribution of household expenditures. We do not display the motives for transfers along the 
geograhic location of senders because, among transfers sent by close relatives, there are no 
differences depending on whether they live in Senegal or abroad
Table 1: Transfers motivations 
 
          Source of transfer
Motive
(within source)
Close Relatives Other (relatives and non 
relatives)
Education 4.16 1.43
Financial problems 37.09 16.03
Health 1.80 1.53
Pilgrimage to Mecca 0.19 0.40




Bride price 0.19 0.45
Funerals 0.38 2.18
Other ceremony 6.43 8.76
Gift for other reason 38.88 42.11
Religious Contribution (Aadiya) 0.57 1.98
Other 7.28 4.06
N Observations 1057 2021
Table 2 – Amount remitted according to the motive for transfers  
Yearly amount in 
CFA francs




Education 387555 589 73
Financial problems 374504 569 716
Health 216348 328 49
Ceremonies 61722 93 815
Other  159745 242 1417
8The bottom decile in terms of household total expenditures receives transfers strikingly less often 
than the rest of the sample (44.7% of them receive at least one transfer vs about 58% for the other 9 
deciles). However, among those households who receive at least one transfer, the share of the 
expenditures it represents decreases with income, from 25.7% for the bottom decile to 11.5% for 
the top one.
The question we raise here is whether the pattern of remittances describe in this section can be 
related to intra-household inequality in food consumption, total consumption and education.
Theoretical discussion
If the household decision process were such that it could be represented by the classical unitary 
model of a single decision maker, maximizing a household utility function given a single budget 
constraint, the source of income would not affect consumption decisions.
If transfers received by a particular individual affect differently his group well-being and that of 
other household members, it can be because this canonical model fails to hold for different reasons. 
First, the household decision making process may be such that members negotiate over the sharing 
of total resources, as represented in the collective household model. In such a case, increasing the 
household’s resources increases one’s negotiating power and hence increases the share of total 
consumption one can capture. In such a case, the source of income should not matter: whether one 
controls a large share of the household total resources because his labour income is high or because 
he receives large transfers does not make any difference to the way his negotiating power is 
affected. Note that it could also happen that even if household decisions are accurately represented 
by the collective household model, because of their different nature, remittances and labour income 
affect the bargaining power of individual household members differently. If for example, receiving 
remittances is a sign of greater social connection, it may bring more negotiating power than labour 
income.
Second, the collective household model may not hold either, because of the absence of fungibility 
of all income, a necessary condition for Pareto optimality to hold. As discussed below, non-
fungibility can emerge from separate budgets among various household members of from different 
use of different income sources, according to their nature. 
9If various groups have separate budgets and manage them independently from each other, the 
household decision making process cannot be represented either by the unitary or the collective 
household model. Each household member has the possibility to decide over the spending of the 
income he generates and the transfers he receives. S/he could altruistically share the transfers 
received with the whole household or restrict the benefits to his or her group. This model and the 
collective household model give rise to the same empirical prediction that who controls the transfer 
or the income affects who benefits from it.
The other possibility is the existence of social norms such that, according to the source of income 
(labour or transfers), the non-sharing of it may be more or less acceptable. For example, remittances 
received from a parent abroad may be perceived as an occasional present that does not need to be 
shared with the rest of the household. It would be somewhat analogous to the situation described by 
Duflo and Udry in Côte d’Ivoire. In such a case, the elasticity of own expenditures relative to own 
transfers will be different from both the elasticity of own expenditures to own labour income and to 
transfers received by other groups. Hence, the difference in the impact of resources controlled by an 
individual on the consumption of his group and the consumption of other groups may not be the 
same according to whether these resources arise from transfers or from labour income. In this case, 
it could be expected that the social norms apply differently for different types of expenditures. For 
example, it might not be acceptable to keep transfers to increase one’s food consumption without 
sharing with the rest of the household, while it might well be deemed acceptable to spend the same 
transfers on the education of one’s own children without contributing to the education of other 
children in the household. Note that if social norms apply in the same way for all expenditures, then 
it will be empirically impossible to distinguish the predictions of this model from that of a 
collective model in which the bargaining power is affected differently by remittances and labour 
income. The conclusions that can be drawn regarding the fungibility of the various sources of 
income will hence rely crucially on the comparison between the differential effects of remittances 
and earned income on various consumption expenditures.
Finally, the use of transfers might be controlled by the sender. It could for example be the case that 
the remitter earmarks the use of the funds he sends for some type of investment: children’s 
education, housing improvement etc.. The receiving individual has only partial control over the use 
of the funds and the impact of those resources can then be different from the impact of other 
resources if the amount earmarked is not infra-marginal and pushes the household to a corner 
solution. In this case, as in the previous one, various sources of incomes are not completely 
fungible.
10Empirical strategy
Given the objective of this paper, we look separately at the various subgroups in the household and 
for each of them we separate the impact of transfers received by a member of this group and those 
received by a member of another group within the same household. In keeping with the above 
discussion, we also want to examine two aspects. First, we want to see whether receiving transfers 
has a similar effect on group expenditures than earning the same amount from labour. Second, we 
wish to explore the fact that things might differ according to the types of expenditures; in which 
case, a potential impact of transfers on group well-being might be of short or long term relevance 
according to the expenses it affects. We will focus for the time being on food consumption, total 
expenditures (except lodging), and education outcomes. We have in mind that if transfers generate a 
difference in educational investment, this difference will perpetuate in the long run, which might be 
less the case for the other two variables.
Hence, in a first step, we simply look at the way transfers affect group outcomes in terms of food 
consumption, of total consumption or education according to the identity of the beneficiary, 
controlling for a number of characteristics, among which earned income of different groups.
The basic specification is linear and relates the consumption of a particular set of goods by group n 
to the transfers received by the group, Tn, and its income from other sources, Yn, the transfers 
received by the other groups in the household and their other income (Tn’ and Yn’) and a set of 
household and group characteristics Zn (notably demographics):
. 
n n n n n n n u Z Y Y T T C + + + + + = z d g b a ' ' ' (1)
The first result of interest will be the comparison between (α, β) and (γ,δ). If they differ, it will 
show that transfers and earned income do not affect consumption patterns in the same way, which 
might be compatible with both the case of a collective model in which bargaining powers are 
affected differently by different sources of income and with the case of non fungibility between 
transfers and other incomes.  The comparison of these coefficients across estimations of equation 
(1) for different sets of consumption good will allow to distinguish the two.
The second comparison of interest is that of α and β. If they are different, it will indicate that 
income is not pooled within the household. A polar case would be α = 1 and β = 0.  It would 
indicate that remittances are entirely kept by the designated beneficiary. The same is true of the 
11comparison of γ and δ. Also, if α and β are very different while γ and δ are equal, this may indicate 
that transfers are not fungible while other sources of income are.
We first examine the allocation of food consumption. It is not obvious that we should expect the 
identity of the beneficiary of the transfer to have an impact on the allocation of food consumption, if 
only because transfers in cash are never earmarked for food. Furthermore, it seems easier for a 
household to share food than other consumption goods, such as durables or, naturally, education, as 
such goods cannot be easily divided. Thus even if a particular member benefits from a transfer, it 
might not increase his own food consumption more than that of other household members. Finally, 
it is likely that negotiations over the use of resources do not bear on food, for which it can be 
expected that social norms and altruism combine to make sure that everyone is fed at least 
according to their needs, when resources are sufficient for that. To study this issue, we construct a 
measure of per capita food expenditures that has two components. First, the amount of common 
expenditures dedicated to food is simply divided by household size in order to get a per capita 
amount of this common consumption. Second, food expenditures at the group level are measured by 
dividing the amount spent daily on the preparation of meals for the group by the size of the group. 
This daily spending is commonly called DQ in Senegal, which stands for “dépense quotidienne”. In 
households with married couples, the DQ is usually given by the husband to his wife who has to 
purchase ingredients (other than staples) and prepare the meal. In polygamous households, each 
wife takes turn to receive the DQ and to take charge of the meal preparations. The DQ provided by 
the husband to each of his wives is in general equitably determined according to the size of her 
group. In large extended families though, several groups might eat separately and the DQ for each 
group might be calculated by different persons and need not be equal.
We look at the impact of the identity of the beneficiary group on each group’s access to food 
consumption and we test whether differential access to transfers has the same effect as different 
labour income.
The same exercise is conducted on non food and total expenditures (except lodging). As we saw 
earlier, there is more within household inequality when looking at total expenditures than just at 
food expenditures. It is therefore of interest to see whether this inequality is driven by transfers or 
more generally by a difference in the control over resources.
Finally, we consider the case of education. All models mentioned above, apart from the unitary 
model, would suggest that transfers received by the group are more than proportionally spent on the 
education of children belonging to this group than on other children of the same household. 
12Furthermore, as discussed, education is clearly a domain where the wish of the remitter, if it is 
expressed, cannot easily be overlooked: if transfers received are earmarked for the education of one 
particular child, it might be difficult for the household as a whole to pool this income with other 
sources and share its benefit. Hence, in such a case we would expect that children belonging to 
groups who directly receive a transfer might get more schooling than if the transfer reaches another 
group in the same household. 
We will look at the impact of transfers on a child’s probability to be enrolled in school, according to 
who received the transfer. 
Transfers received are likely to be endogenous to the consumption decisions (typically if migration 
is a household decision for example). We attempted to correct for this endogeneity by instrumenting 
transfers received by a group with the demographic characteristics of the siblings of the adult group 
members.
2 However instruments proved to be very weak and instrumentation appears to add more 
noise to the estimation than to correct for a possible endogeneity bias. Thus we resolved not to 
instrument the model. However we use the particular structure of our data to remove household 
fixed effects, which limits the issues arising from household level unobserved heterogeneity. 
Finally, it is worth noting that we exclude the groups that include household heads. In fact, as 
mentioned in the descriptive statistics section, those groups often receive transfers that are aimed at 
the whole household (as a result, the ratio of their transfer to their consumption is often greater than 
one) and are therefore different from the rest of the household with respect to their use of the 
transfer. In order to stick to meaningful comparisons, we, therefore, concentrate on the subsample 
of groups who belong to households composed of at least 3 groups and that do not include the 
household head. We are left with 1621 observations. It is to be noted that those households are 
poorer than average, with an average per capita consumption of  about 338000 FCFA as compared 
to 520000 FCFA for the whole sample. They also receive three times less transfers on a per capita 
basis than average (16000 vs. 46800). When studying educational outcomes we further restrict the 
sample to group that include at least one child of school age (between 7 and 17 years old). We then 
consider 1721 children in 821 groups.
2We use the number of siblings of all adult members who are neither sibling of the group head, nor his children or 
grand-children. We also use the number of brothers and the number of sisters of the group head. Similar variables are 
constructed to instrument for transfers received by the other group within the households.
13Preliminary Results
Results are presented in tables 3 to 5. Expenditure regressions are shown in tables 3 and 4. Tables 
3a and 4a show the results obtained with our basis specification, where the dependent and the 
explanatory variables are in levels. Tables 3b and 4b show the results obtained with a log-log 
specification. Finally table 5 show the results obtained for school enrolment.
Food expenditures
As mentioned, we can measure food expenditures in two sets: the expenditures for which the 
household head is in charge on behalf of the whole household and the food expenditures managed 
separately by each group, even if some of those are paid by the household head as well. We try to 
assess here whether transfers received by the group itself have a larger impact on its own food 
consumption than transfer received by other groups, where we distinguish separately the Household 
Head's group.
The sample is restricted to households with at least three groups, excluding the group of the 
household head. In this sample, yearly average per capita food expenditure is about 185000 CFA 
for the household as a whole. As already mentioned, for 95% of the households there is not that 
much variation between sub groups.
When using OLS to regress per capita food expenditures on per capita transfers, results show that 
the only determinants of per capita food expenditure in the group are the level of transfers received 
by the household head and the income per capita of that group (table 3a, column 1). Neither the 
transfers received by the group itself, nor its labour income have a significant effect.
14This result holds in the log-log specification (table 3b, column 1), though the impact of transfers 
received by the household head appear less significantly determined and the household head's group 



































Constant 87,194.8 249,170.1 336,364.9*
(55,252.5) (190,446.0) (200,683.0)
Observations 1620 1620 1620
0.068 0.044 0.053
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3a: Variables in levels
Food exp. Non food exp.
Transfers rec. by group per cap.
Transfers rec. by o. groups per cap.
Transfers rec. by hh group per cap.
Group labour inc. per cap.
O. groups labour inc. per cap.








Group head is female
Household head is female
Urban
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
15Part of the transfers' endogeneity bias, if any, can be removed by using a household fixed effect 
model. The results are shown in tables 4a and 4b. Here all the household level variables are dropped 
and only the group level variables remain. For both specification, estimates in the fixed effect 




































Constant 11.560*** 10.860*** 12.066***
(0.123) (0.162) (0.127)
Observations 1618 1617 1620
0.149 0.426 0.305
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3b: Log-log specification
Food exp. Non food exp.
Log Transfers rec. by group per cap.
Log Transfers rec. by o. groups per cap.
Log Transfers rec. by hh group per cap.
Log Group labour inc. per cap.
Log O. groups labour inc. per cap.








Group head is female
Household head is female
Urban
R-squared





















Constant 159,151.4*** 294,135.7 453,287.1**
(16,194.4) (190,109.2) (190,801.8)
Observations 1620 1620 1620
0.015 0.015 0.016
597 597 597
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4a: Fixed effects results - variables in levels
Food exp. Non food exp.
Transfers rec. by group per cap.
Transfers rec. by o. groups per cap.
Group labour inc. per cap.





Group head is female
R-squared
Number of idmen





















Constant 11.535*** 11.645*** 12.425***
(0.050) (0.160) (0.093)
Observations 1618 1617 1620
0.018 0.140 0.097
596 597 597
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4b: Fixed effects results - Log-log specification
Food exp. Non food exp.
Log Transfers rec. by group per cap.
Log Transfers rec. by o. groups per cap.
Log Group labour inc. per cap.





Group head is female
R-squared
Number of idmen
Standard errors in parenthesesThese results are in line with what is suggested by the descriptive statistics of our sample: in 95% of 
the households, there is not much inequality in the food consumption of various groups. Regression 
estimates show only a positive impact of transfers received by the household head, which should be 
expected, given that heads very often have responsibility in carrying for the staple consumptions.
Non Food and Total expenditures
Estimations of the impact of transfers on non food and total expenditures (except lodging) tell a 
different story. Here again, we do not dwell on the results of instrumented equations since 
instruments are too weak. The interesting point here is that the straight OLS (tables 1a and 1b, 
columns 2 and 3) show a strong and very significant effect of the group transfers on the level of per 
capita expenditures. The log-log specification shows a positive and significant effect of transfers 
received by other groups (including that of the head) in the household, but this result does not hold 
in the fixed effects regressions (tables 2a and 2b, columns 2 and 3), whereas the impact of transfers 
received by the group remain positive and significant. Labour income, on the other hand, is not 
found significant.
Thus own transfers affect positively group expenditures, while other transfers do not. This result 
says that a group that receive more transfers than average in his household has a higher level of per 
capita consumption than other groups.
Clearly, endogeneity might be an issue, and it prevents us from interpreting this result causally. 
Nevertheless, the difference between this result and what was found in the case of food 
consumption is telling. A difference in access to transfers is associated with a difference in non food 
and total per capita expenditures, but not with a difference in per capita food expenditures. It is 
consistent with a situation in which household share resources when it comes to food consumption, 
but do not pool all their incomes. Not surprisingly, the unitary household model would therefore be 
rejected. 
To go a bit further in this exploration, the fact that labour income does not appear to impact 
expenditures per capita in the fixed effect model, while own transfers remain a significant 
determinant of own expenditures, suggests that transfers and labour income are not perfectly 
fungible sources of income. If this were to be confirmed, it would tell that the collective model of 
household behaviour does not either provide an accurate description of Senegalese households’ 
behaviour.
18School enrolment
Table 5 gives the results for school enrolment of children ages 7 to 17 years old. The LHS variable 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the child is currently enrolled, hence the estimates are obtained by a probit. 
As indicated above, the estimation is again restricted to households containing at least 3 groups and 
excluding the group of the household head.
In this sample, 51% of the children in the relevant age group are currently enrolled in school. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in these regressions are provided in appendix 1. Only 
63% of the children are child of the household head and 5% have been fostered either to the 
household head or to the group head. Household head is a female in only 5% of the cases, but 82% 
of the sub groups are headed by females, which can be expected given the definitions of the sub 
groups in the survey.
Results are very clearly compatible with a situation where transfers can be earmarked or captured 
by the subgroup who receives them: transfers received by a member of the group affect positively 
the probability of being enrolled. By contrast, transfers received by another group in the same 
household (excluding that of the head) have no effect whatsoever on enrolment. Transfers received 
by the head have a positive effect, but much smaller in size and less significant.
Other controls have the expected impact (urban household, educated parents and age all affect the 
probability of being enrolled positively). Interestingly we notice that fostered children have a higher 























































*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Probit on school enrolment
(marginal effects)
Transfers rec. by group per cap.
Transfers rec. by o. groups per cap.
Transfers rec. by hh group per cap.
Group labour inc. per cap.
O. groups labour inc. per cap.






Father went to French school








Group head is female




Standard errors in parenthesesConclusion
These preliminary results add to already existing evidences on the absence of income pooling 
within African households. It nevertheless sketches a more subtle story, whereby the impact of 
different access to income on consumption and well being depends both on the good considered and 
on the source of income. As a result, it suggests that not only the unitary household model is likely 
to be inadequate, but the collective household model is probably hardly more suitable to the 
description of Senegalese households. The observed pattern of consumption seems consistent with a 
situation where norms interfere with decisions, so as to ensure that basics needs are covered for 
everyone and to allow exclusive use of some types of income (remittances) but not others (labour 
income). 
If this is to be interpreted causally, implications in terms of individual welfare are important. In fact, 
an increase in income will translates into an improvement in the situation of the various household 
members in a way that depends on who controls the extra income and how it was obtained. It 
suggests that potential crowding out of private transfers by public transfers might be less of a 
problem than usually anticipated, if the beneficiary of the public transfers is adequately targeted. 
Hence, those results underline the need for a careful analysis of intra-household resources allocation 
that encompasses the analysis of the origin of the household income, if one wants to be able to 
target efficiently public policies aimed at poverty alleviation.
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23Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics on the sample used for the education models
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Currently enrolled in school 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Child of the household head 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
Fostered to household head 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
Child of group head 0.85 0.35 0.00 1.00
Fostered to group head 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
Child's age 11.73 3.19 7.00 17.00
Child's sex (1 = male) 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Father went to french school 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Ln(Transfer per cap. received by group) 2.30 4.02 0.00 13.02
Ln(Transfer per cap. received by other groups exc. 
HH Head) 2.86 4.40 0.00 12.71
Ln(Transfer per cap. received by group of HH 
Head) 3.96 5.30 0.00 14.40
Household head is female 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Group head is female 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00
Size of the group 5.52 2.10 1.00 15.00
Size of the household 14.92 6.12 1.00 36.00
Urban 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics on the sample used for the regression on food expenditures 
and total expenditures.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Per capita food exp.  (group level) 1471 185363.7 317020 0 4693193
Per capita food exp. (household level) 1471 183962.7 295079.4 0 3808194
Non-food exp. except housing p.c. (group level) 1471 311422.5 443182.2 24348.35 4857936
Non-food exp. except housing p.c. (hh level) 1471 333175.3 474016.7 29693.27 4392875
Total exp. p.c (group level) 1471 316127.8 446505.9 24348.35 4857936
Total exp p.c. (household level) 1471 337736.2 477098 29693.27 4392875
Transfers received (hh level) 1471 206223.2 403382.4 0 1950000
Transfers received p.c. (hh level) 1471 16079.48 33690.94 0 300000
Transfers received p.c. (group level) 1471 10884.49 45641.39 0 600000
Transfers p.c.  received by other groups 1470 19719.75 48253.75 0 800000
Household size 1471 13.65602 6.224482 1 36
Urban 1471 .3902107 .4879633 0 1
Household head is a woman 1471 .0883753 .2839364 0 1
Group head is a woman 1471 .743032 .4371102 0 1
Group size 1471 3.793338 2.028567 1 15
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